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Judicial Deference at Work: Some Refl ections 
on Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun Ming
Q
Cora Chan*
“Due deference” – the giving of appropriate weight to the government’s judg-
ment in the court’s reasoning – is a tool that courts use to maintain the sepa-
ration of powers in constitutional rights review. This note aims to provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding the issue of deference, and to analyse 
the Court of First Instance (CFI)’s approach to deference in two recent cases, 
Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun Ming. The author argues that the CFI has 
adopted a spatial approach that failed to specify the contested issues that called 
for deference, inappropriately considered democratic legitimacy as a factor for 
deference and made broad presumptions about the democratic character of pri-
mary decisions. This approach may lead to an over-deferential attitude that 
threatens the separation of powers, and the malleability of the approach may be 
subject to courts’ manipulation. The author argues for a more context-sensitive 
approach based purely on institutional factors. 
Introduction
For as long as the history of administrative law there have been con-
cerns that courts might overstep the boundaries of separation of powers 
by substituting judgment of the government. Such concerns are particu-
larly relevant in jurisdictions where courts’ powers have been expanded 
to cover scrutiny of government action for conformity with constitu-
tional rights. The United Kingdom (UK) is one such jurisdiction. The 
UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has laid down a new constitutional 
order whereby courts can review primary legislation and acts of public 
authorities for conformity with rights protected under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.1 Hong Kong (HK) is another example 
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1 Human Rights Act 1998 (C 42) (HRA), ss 1 to 4, 6 and 8. The HRA gave effect to the rights 
guaranteed in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(also called the European Convention on Human Rights), agreed by the Council of Europe at 
Rome on 4 Nov 1950.
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of such jurisdictions. The HK Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) and the 
HK Basic Law have entrenched certain rights and empowered courts to 
strike down legislation and executive acts for violation of such rights.2
“Due deference” has been the preferred tool for maintaining the sepa-
ration of powers under this new order.3 Despite the vigorous judicial and 
academic debates elsewhere as to when the court should defer to the 
government’s judgment, there seems little attention on this question in 
Hong Kong. In two recent decisions, Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Jus-
tice4 and Kong Yun Ming v Director of Social Welfare,5 the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) answered this question in explicit and elaborate terms. 
This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for understanding 
the issue of judicial deference and to analyse the Court’s approach to 
deference in these two cases.
Two points must be noted. First, the scope of this paper is limited to 
analysing the principles and realities of judicial deference within a single 
legal system only, ie HK courts’ deference towards the HK Legislature and 
Executive on rights issues within the limits of Hong Kong’s autonomy. The 
co-existence of the Mainland and HK legal systems under the principle 
of “One Country Two Systems” has raised unique problems of deference 
in the interface of the two legal systems.6 An analysis of deference in this 
peculiar context, or deference towards the National People’s Congress 
and its Standing Committee, will have to await another opportunity. Sec-
ond, although analysis is conducted on two recent CFI cases only, the 
principles of deference proposed here are meant to be applicable to all 
levels of HK courts. 
Principles of Due Deference
Surveying the Spectrum
Due deference refers to the giving of appropriate weight to the legis-
lature/executive’s judgment in the court’s reasoning.7 There is a wide 
2 Section 6, Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383, Laws of Hong Kong); Arts 11, 84 and 158 of the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
3 Alison L. Young, “In Defence of Due Deference” (2009) 72(4) MLR 554, 555.
4 [2009] 2 HKLRD 166.
5 [2009] 4 HKLRD 382.
6 For a discussion of the approach to deference in these situations, see Albert Chen, “The Court 
of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ Children Case” in Johannes M.M. Chan, H.L. 
Fu, Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Confl ict Over Interpretation (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp 73–96, especially pp 85–90.
7 The HK Court of Final Appeal similarly defi nes deference as the giving of due weight to the 
government’s decision. See Lau Cheong & Another v HKSAR [2002] 2 HKLRD 612, p 641, paras 
100–105.
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spectrum of judicial and academic opinion on the question of when 
courts should defer. On one end of the spectrum, there are those who 
believe that there should not be any independent doctrine of deference.8 
They argue that traditional mechanisms delineating the limits of judicial 
review (eg the non-substitution of merits, proportionality) are suffi cient 
to ensure that the separation of powers is upheld even under the consti-
tutional rights regime. To defer once again within this traditional frame-
work is to defer twice. Courts need only exercise independent assessment 
of the substance of the case under this framework to reach the answer.9
On the other end of the spectrum, spatial approaches, manifested 
most prominently in the doctrine of justiciability, carve out certain sub-
ject areas, or “zones”, in which courts should defer (eg social and eco-
nomic issues, policy areas), and others in which courts should not defer 
(eg fundamental rights). The spatial metaphor denotes “exclusive zones” 
within which one branch of the government is free from intervention by 
another.10 The reasons behind the specifi c demarcation of such zones will 
be elaborated below. According to this approach, the degree of deference 
owed depends on which subject area the case falls into.11 In the middle of 
the spectrum lies the contextual approach, which determines the degree 
of deference in context, according to certain criteria (elaborated below).12
Controversies exist as to what reasons courts should defer for. Some 
believe that courts should defer for both institutional capacity and 
democratic legitimacy reasons,13 while others believe that courts should 
defer on institutional grounds only.14 Institutional reasons for deference 
arise when the primary decision-maker possesses more knowledge and 
expertise, information-gathering capacity and suitable decision-making 
procedures for resolving the issue in hand.15 Democratic legitimacy 
8 One of the most ardent critics of the doctrine of deference is Trevor Allan. See, for instance, 
T.R.S. Allan, “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
CLJ 671. Cf The UK House of Lords’ recent criticism of the concept of deference in Huang 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment [2007] UKHL 11, para 14. Arguably the Court was not calling for the demise of the 
doctrine. See n 3 above.
9 Allan, “Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (n 8 above), pp 678–680.
10 Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 below), pp 339–340. Courts have in various instances ad-
opted this approach. See for instance R v DPP, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 (hereinafter, 
“Kebilene”).
11 See n 3 above, p 565.
12 Alison Young, Murray Hunt, Jeffrey Jowell, and Jeff King are advocates of such an approach. See 
n 3 above; Murray Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Public Law Needs ‘Due Deference’” in Nicholas 
Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds) Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 
p 337; Jeffrey Jowell, “Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?” (2003) Public 
Law 592; Jeff A. King, “Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint” (2008) 28(3) OJLS 409.
13 See for instance Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above).
14 See for instance Jowell, “Judicial Deference” (n 12 above).
15 N.W. Barber, “Prelude to the Separation of Powers”, 60(1) CLJ 59, 72.
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reasons for deference arise when the primary decisions are made through 
a process that involves more participation by those affected and is hence 
more legitimate than the court’s decision-making process.16 Note here 
that both institutional and democratic considerations are relative. In 
short, institutional capacity considerations ask who, the court or the 
primary decision-maker (legislature/executive), is more likely to reach 
the right answer on a particular question, whereas democratic legitimacy 
considerations ask whose decision-making process is more democratic. 
Proposed Theory of Deference
The principles of due deference argued for in this note are contextual and 
depend purely on institutional factors. This position has to be defended, 
fi rst, against those who call for the elimination of deference altogether. 
The obvious fl aw of those who argue that there should not be any doc-
trine of deference is they assume that rights are non-contestable.17 On 
any question of rights, courts can always, on its own assessment, discern 
one right answer from the evidence. However, far from this, there can be 
reasonable disagreements over the defi nition and application of rights.18 
There are times when there is confl icting evidence or a clash of values 
and courts are unsure what the right answer is, or when a judgment has 
to be made on the basis of insuffi cient evidence. These are cases when 
the traditional frameworks of judicial review (eg proportionality) fail to 
point the court to one answer. So the fi rst principle of deference argued 
for here is that in cases of contested rights, and in such cases only, due 
deference is called for. 
Second, a contextual approach is preferred to a spatial approach. A 
spatial approach is wrong in principle and futile in practice. It illegiti-
mately imports the concept of justiciability of the old judicial review 
order into the constitutional rights regime, where courts have power to 
examine even traditionally non-justiciable issues for conformity with 
rights.19 It is based on presumptions of relative institutional capacity in 
various subject matters, which may be incorrect when applied in con-
text. Such an approach is also futile in practice, as cases often cannot 
be neatly pigeon-holed into one subject matter.20 Elements pulling in 
16 See n 3 above, pp 565–566.
17 See n 3 above, pp 576–577.
18 See n 3 above, p 576.
19 See Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above), p 347; Jowell, “Judicial Deference” (n 12 
above), p 599. For a discussion of how the approach to justiciability of resource allocation 
in human rights adjudication is diverging from that in other judicial review cases, see Jeff A. 
King, “The Justiciability of Resource Allocation”, (2007) 70(2) MLR 197.
20 Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above), p 347.
Vol 40 Part 1 Judicial Deference at Work 5
opposite directions regarding deference are often present in a single 
case.21 For example, in Chan Kin Sum, penal policies (deferential “zone”) 
are involved in the context of the fundamental right to vote (non-def-
erential “zone”). Once the attempt to classify cases into sole categories 
fails, spatial approaches offer no guidance to courts as to when to defer. 
The key to a contextual approach is specifi city: courts should narrow down 
as far as possible in context the particular question on which they are institu-
tionally less capable of disposing. Deferring on that issue does not necessarily 
mean that courts will agree with the government on the fi nal outcome of 
the case, which may depend on the determination of a host of other issues. 
Third, institutional factors should determine when courts should 
defer, because the legislature, executive and courts have different forms 
that make them suitable for performing certain functions and not oth-
ers.22 Respecting such differences is a crucial step to upholding the 
separation of powers, the true spirit of which is to allocate functions 
to institutions in a way that can most effi ciently realise constitutional 
values.23 As compared to the legislature/executive, courts may have less 
expertise and intelligence-gathering capacity in deciding, for example, 
whether a state’s national security is under terrorist threat. The triadic 
structure of the court may render it less apt to deal with what Fuller 
calls “polycentric” issues – issues which are interrelated with many other 
issues.24 Depending on the right/issues involved, the immunity of courts 
from electoral pressure may make it more impartial than a legislature for 
resolving confl icts between majority and minority voices that are purely 
of value judgments. Courts should therefore decide in context, whether 
it or the legislature/executive is more likely to reach the right answer on 
a particular contested question. 
Fourth, democratic legitimacy should not, on its own, be a factor for 
deference. Deferring on democratic legitimacy grounds is constitutionally 
illegitimate and unnecessary. The instrument that entrenches rights and 
endows courts with the role of protecting them (may it be a constitutional 
document like the Basic Law or a piece of legislation like the BORO or 
21 Ibid.
22 See n 15 above, pp 71–88.
23 Barber made a similar argument, contending that the point of separation of powers is to allocate 
tasks in a way that best serves the “purposes for which the state existed”. See n 15 above, pp 64, 
71. Yap implicitly argued that courts should defer on institutional grounds, but for him, courts 
should take the separation of powers as stipulated in the text of the constitution as the conclu-
sive indicator of relative institutional competence. See Po Jen Yap, “Interpreting the Basic Law 
and the Adjudication of Politically Sensitive Questions”, Chinese Journal of International Law 
(2007), Vol 6, No 3, pp 560–561. 
24 Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 92 Harv. Law Rev. 353, 393–404, see n 15 
above, pp 74–76.
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HRA) has fundamentally changed the constitutional order: democracy 
is no longer equated with majority rule, but is made conditional upon the 
protection of certain rights.25 Constitutional rights review is introduced 
precisely to protect individual rights against majority intrusion. To say 
that a right should be defi ned in a certain way just because the majority 
wills it runs against the logic of the new constitutional order. Of course, 
if a range of decisions can be compatible with rights protection, then 
courts should respect government decisions that are within this range. 
However, this attitude of restraint has already been built in through the 
ordinary tests of judicial review.26 For instance, in testing the proportion-
ality of the government’s decisions, courts should not substitute merits.27 
To defer on top of such principles is superfl uous and risks double counting 
the role of the majority in formulating policies.28
This is not to say that democratic factors cannot be relevant in deter-
mining the institutional capacity question.29 On some issues, the fact that 
there has been more public participation or debate in the decision may 
render the decision more likely to be correct.30 On these questions, courts 
should, for the purposes of determining whether the government is in a 
better position to get the right answer, consider how healthily democratic 
mechanisms are functioning in practice and whether relevant parties have 
been given genuine opportunities to participate in the primary decision-
making process.31 It is rare, though certainly possible, that the primary 
decision-making process incorporates public opinion as little as the court 
process does. In these cases, democratic grounds for deference do not exist, 
even if they may be relevant in determining institutional capacity. 
To summarise, and applying these principles to Hong Kong, courts 
are suggested to adopt the following steps in determining deference in 
constitutional rights review:
1. Courts should assess the totality of evidence and decide if any 
contested rights issue(s) is/are involved. If none is involved, then 
courts should decide the case on its own judgment under ordinary 
principles of proportionality and non-substitution of merits: there 
25 Jowell, “Judicial Deference” (n 12 above), p 597.
26 See n 3 above, p 570.
27 Ibid. 
28 See Allan, “Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (n 8 above), p 680; see n 3 above, p 570, 574–575.
29 See n 3 above, pp 565–566.
30 Even Jeffrey Jowell, who argues that democratic factors should not be a ground for deference, 
acknowledges this. Jeffrey Jowell, “Judicial Deference and Human Rights: a Question of Com-
petence” in Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in 
Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 67, p 80.
31 Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above), p 354.
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is no room for deference. If there is/are contested issue(s), courts 
should narrow down the contested issue(s) and proceed as follows.
2. The degree of deference owed should not be determined by the 
classifi cation of the case as one of certain subject matter. Instead 
courts should assess, for each contested question, whether the court 
or the primary decision-maker is institutionally more equipped to 
reach the right decision. This may depend on whether the court or 
the primary decision-maker possesses more expertise, information-
gathering capacity, and suitable decision-making processes for 
resolving the specifi c issue. 
3. Democracy legitimacy should not, on its own ground, be a factor 
for deference. It may only be relevant insofar as it affects the ques-
tion of who is more likely to get the right answer. 
4. However, HK courts should cautiously scrutinise democratic 
legitimacy factors even for the purpose of determining whether the 
government is more likely to be correct, bearing in mind that only 
half of the HK Legislative Council is returned by universal suffrage 
as of today, and the HK Government does not have a particularly 
promising record for conducting thorough public consultations 
and incorporating public views refl ected through consultations.
Due Deference at Work
Synopsis of the Two Cases
Principles of deference are rarely expressly elaborated in HK courts but in 
two recent judgments, Judge Cheung extensively discussed such principles. 
In Chan Kin Sum, the CFI held, inter alia, that provisions banning prisoners 
from voting and registering as voters under ss 31(1)(a) and (b) and 53(5)
(a) and (b) of the Legislative Council Ordinance constituted unreasonable 
restrictions on the right to vote guaranteed by Art 26 of the Basic Law and 
Art 21 of the HK Bill of Rights.32 Applying the proportionality test, the 
Court found that crime prevention, encouraging citizen-like conduct and 
enhancing civic responsibility and respect for rule of law could be legiti-
mate objectives.33 However, no evidence was adduced to show that there 
was a rational connection between such aims and the means.34 Moreover, 
the automatic and indiscriminate restrictions on the prisoner’s right to vote 
were arbitrary and disproportionate. They failed to take account of the 
32 See n 4 above at p 231, para 202.
33 See n 4 above at pp 197–201, paras 88–97.
34 See n 4 above at pp 213–215, paras 139–145.
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nature and seriousness of the crime, the type and duration of imprisonment 
imposed and the individual circumstances of the case.35
The Court conceded that the Government had better expertise to 
resolve whether prisoner disenfranchisement could achieve the stated 
objectives, and that “if there is competing evidence before the Court, 
and the Court fi nds it diffi cult to determine the dispute, it might well be 
wise for the Court to defer to the wisdom of the legislature and experts”.36 
Yet the Government adduced no evidence at all to illustrate a rational 
connection.37 The Court also conceded the Government’s argument that 
prisoner disenfranchisement was a policy issue that the Government was 
more apt to settle because: (a) the latter was more likely to reach a deci-
sion acceptable to majority of the public; and (b) the issue had wide-
spread ramifi cations and the Government was more equipped in making 
a decision that dealt with them.38 Yet this concern was found to be irrel-
evant since the Court was only examining, not settling, policies.39 Later 
in the judgment, the Court remarked that it had given due deference to 
legislative choices but this could not relieve the Court of its responsibil-
ity to examine whether the restrictions were justifi ed.40
In Kong Yun Ming, the same court held that the seven-year residence 
requirement for obtaining Comprehensive Social Security Assistance 
(CSSA) did not violate the right to equality under Art 25 of the Basic 
Law and Art 22 of the HK Bill of Rights, and constituted a due restriction 
to the right to social welfare guaranteed in Art 36 and in accordance with 
Art 145 of the Basic Law. Maintaining the sustainability of the social wel-
fare system was held to be a legitimate aim and rationally connected to the 
means.41 On the question of proportionality and the Government’s discre-
tion to restrict the right to welfare, the Court explained that it should 
defer substantially for both institutional and constitutional reasons in a 
case such as this that involved social and economic matters.42 Such mat-
ters are a question of politics for offi cials, not for courts.43 The Court thus 
found the restriction proportionate.44 Clearly, the fact that the Director of 
Social Welfare had the discretion to waive the residence requirement was 
an important consideration in the Court’s assessment on proportionality.45
35 See n 4 above at pp 207–213, paras 112–138.
36 See n 4 above at p 215, paras 142–143.
37 See n 4 above at p 215, para 143.
38 See n 4 above at p 217, paras 148–149.
39 See n 4 above at p 217, para 149.
40 See n 4 above at pp 219–220, paras 155–157.
41 See n 5 above at p 415, paras 124–126.
42 See n 5 above at pp 416–417, paras 127–131.
43 Ibid.
44 See n 5 at p 418, para 135.
45 See n 5 at p 417, paras 133–134.
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Examining the Court’s Approach to Deference
It is possible to distill four characteristics (if short of principles) of judi-
cial deference from the two judgments. 
Spatial Approach 
First, in both cases, there is a strong spatial fl avour with the Court’s 
approach. The degree of deference due is determined automatically by 
the subject matter involved. Both cases cited with approval the oft-
quoted passage of Lord Hope in R v DPP, ex p Kebilene, which advocated 
a spatial approach to deference: courts should recognise that there is 
an “area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer”; it would 
be easier to recognise such “discretionary area of judgment” in issues of 
qualifi ed rights and social or economic policy, and less so in questions 
of unqualifi ed rights, constitutionally important rights and rights that 
courts were particularly good at assessing.46 So, in Kong Yun Ming, the 
Court emphasised repeatedly that it should defer since social and eco-
nomic matters were involved.47 Similarly, the Court in Chan Kin Sum 
accepted that there is “force” in the contention that courts should give 
the government a wide “margin of appreciation” when judging issues of 
penal policy.48
As argued above, one of the many problems with determining the 
extent of deference based on classifi cation of the case as one of cer-
tain subject matter is, deferential and non-deferential “zones” often 
intermingle in the same case. In Chan Kin Sum, penal policies were 
considered in the context of assessing restrictions on the fundamental 
right to vote. In Kong Yun Ming, socio-economic policies were relevant 
in evaluating limitations to the right to welfare, which has (whether 
one agrees with such categorisation or not) been categorised as a fun-
damental right in the Basic Law. Just which “sphere” should override 
in determining the amount of deference due is unresolved. In fact, 
the spatial approach advocated in Kebilene has been subject to much 
academic criticism in the UK,49 and UK courts have in some cases 
departed from such approach.50 It is time that the Court steps out of 
the shadows of justiciability and fully navigate its role vis-à-vis the 
government in a constitutional democracy.
46 Kebilene (n 10 above), at 380E to 381D.
47 See n 5 above at pp 411, 414, 416, paras 102, 117–119, 127–131.
48 See n 4 above at pp 216–217, paras 148–149.
49 See for instance, Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above), p 345. Murray Hunt dubbed Lord 
Hope’s spatial approach in Kebilene as the “wrong turn”. 
50 See for instance, Porter v South Bucks District Council [2002] 1 All ER 425 and commentary in 
Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight” (n 12 above), pp 366–367.
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Failure to Specify Contested Rights Issue and thus Justify 
Why Deference is Called for
This leads to the second feature of the approach to deference in Chan Kin 
Sum and Kong Yun Ming: failure to specify the contested rights issue, and 
hence justify why deference was called for. In both cases, the Court pro-
claimed broad principles of deference that applied to the whole case with-
out delineating what specifi cally the Court was having trouble deciding on and 
thus why deference was necessary (an exception to this criticism was when the 
Court in Chan Kin Sum specifi ed (in the form of a concession) that resolv-
ing the question of whether prisoner disenfranchisement could achieve the 
stated aims required expertise and the Court was prepared to defer if there 
was competing evidence).51 This, coupled with the fact that the evidence 
as revealed in the two judgments was so lopsided in favour of the (eventually) 
winning parties, encourages suspicions that these cases did not involve con-
tested rights and there was no room for deference in the fi rst place.
In Kong Yun Ming, what precisely was the socio-economic question 
that the Court was having diffi culty resolving? The Court reiterated the 
Government’s evidence in length.52 The Government provided abun-
dant evidence to justify why the residence requirement was a propor-
tionate means to achieve the sustainability of social welfare scheme. The 
Government showed that the residence requirement refl ected an appli-
cant’s contribution to the HK economy, a rational basis for allocating 
scarce resources. The Director of Social Welfare retained the discretion 
to waive the residence requirement, thus mitigating any disproportion-
ality that might be caused in extreme cases. The Court failed to specify 
what the contested issue was. On the evidence revealed from the judg-
ment, there seems none.
In Chan Kin Sum, the question of rational connection between means 
and ends was not an issue of contested rights since the Government pro-
vided no evidence at all to prove a rational connection between the 
stated aims and the restrictions.53 This was rightly acknowledged by the 
Court.54 Yet the concept of deference continued to haunt the Court as 
it later remarked that it should defer to the fact that the Legislature had 
“twice voted down attempts to remove the same or similar restrictions”.55 
But deference on what contested question? The Court failed to tell. This 
failure to specify the disputed issue leads to some diffi culties with the 
Court’s reasoning. 
51 See n 4 above at p 215, paras 142–143.
52 See n 5 above at pp 388–395, paras 12–32.
53 See n 4 above at p 215, para 144.
54 Ibid.
55 See n 4 above at pp 219–220, paras 155–157.
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First, it led to the apparent redundancy of deference. The Court indi-
cated that it had deferred to legislative choices to keep the restrictions, 
but this did not relieve it of its duty to examine such restrictions to see if 
they were justifi ed.56 The Court eventually found that they were not.57 A 
possible interpretation of these statements is that the Court was saying 
deference to legislative choices on one issue of proportionality should not 
absolve it from the responsibility to examine other issues of proportional-
ity, the scrutiny of which eventually led to a fi nding of disproportionality. 
However, without specifying what issue the Court deferred on, a more 
natural reading of these statements is that deference applied to the whole 
issue of proportionality, but it ultimately became a consideration external 
to, and thus played no part in, the Court’s assessment of proportionality. 
Second, it led indirectly to an unconvincing attempt to classify the 
case as an exception to the enunciated principles of deference. The Court 
accepted a general principle of deference in judging penal philosophy 
and policies.58 However, the evidence was so clear on the facts that there 
was nothing to defer on. The Court justifi ed its non-deference by argu-
ing that it was only examining penal policies (where it need not defer), 
not settling penal policies (where it had to defer).59 Yet this distinction 
is insuffi cient to justify non-deference because when the Court examines 
the policy and strikes it down for unconstitutionality, it in effect over-
rides the Government’s expertise and legitimacy in no less way than set-
tling a policy would. This fl aw in reasoning would have been avoided if 
the Court either pinned down a contested issue or admitted that there 
was no contested issue.
All this is not to say that deference would not have been relevant in 
the two cases. Rather, the point is that the Court failed to specify what 
exactly the issue it was deferring on is and hence justify why deference 
was called for in the two cases. 
Democratic Legitimacy Considered as a Ground for Deference
Both judgments used institutional as well as democratic reasons to justify 
deference. In Chan Kin Sum, the Court deferred on the ground that the Leg-
islature had voted down attempts to lift the restrictions.60 It also accepted 
the Government’s argument that we should defer judgment on penal policy 
56 See n 4 above at pp 219–220, paras 156–157.
57 See n 4 above at pp 207–212, paras 112–134.
58 See n 4 above at pp 216–217, paras 148–149. The Court accepted that there was force in the 
contention that the Court should defer in judging penal philosophy and policy.
59 See n 4 above at p 217, paras 149.
60 See n 4 above at p 219, para 155.
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for both institutional and democratic reasons.61 Democracy was relevant for 
both legitimacy and institutional reasons: the Court accepted the argument 
that the Government and Legislature could better reach a position that 
most people could accept (legitimacy reason for democracy),62 and that the 
Government was better equipped in collecting different views to under-
stand and solve the polycentric issue (institutional reason for democracy).63 
In Kong Yun Ming, democracy was relevant, clearly for legitimacy reasons, 
although it is not clear whether it was also relevant for institutional rea-
sons: “striking a balance is by nature a political job for the Government 
and the Legislature with the involvement of public opinion … [Increasing 
the length of the residence requirement] is not something the courts are 
constitutional entitled and institutional equipped to interfere with”.64
In any case, the point to be made is democratic legitimacy should 
not, on its own, be a factor for deference. The Court is abdicating its 
role under a constitutional democracy by deferring on rights issues to 
majority opinion for its own sake. Also, if, for example, the residence 
requirement in Kong Yun Ming is within the range of decisions compat-
ible with protecting the equal right to welfare, then under traditional 
principles of non-substitution of merits and proportionality, the Court 
would have upheld it anyway. If, however, the residence requirement is 
outside such range of decisions, then under ordinary principles of rights 
review it would have been struck down in any case. Deferring on demo-
cratic legitimacy grounds is unnecessary.
These two cases revealed that the Court has yet to fully grasp its con-
stitutional role in protecting rights against majoritarianism. This may 
in part be due to the Court’s reliance on English authorities, in which 
deference on democratic grounds is a recurring theme. Yet the English 
debate on deference is set against a background of lingering parliamen-
tary supremacy. Arguably, the HRA has not swept away such notion, as 
UK courts still do not have the power to strike down legislation (exercis-
ing “weak” judicial review only)65 and the UK parliament remains free to 
legislate contrary to rights.66 Even in the UK, though, there have been 
calls for courts to discard democracy as a ground for deference.67 The 
situation is different in Hong Kong, where our constitutional order lays 
61 See n 4 above at pp 216–217, paras 148–149.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 See n 5 above at pp 414, 416, paras 118, 129.
65 The distinction between strong and weak judicial review was introduced in Jeremy Waldron, 
“The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 15 Yale Law Journal, 1346, 1354.
66 Jowell, “Question of Competence” (n 30 above), p 70.
67 See for example Jowell, “Question of Competence” (n 30 above).
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down unequivocally that courts have the fi nal word in protecting rights 
within the limits of Hong Kong’s autonomy (exercising “strong” judicial 
review),68 and where there is no tradition of legislative supremacy within 
Hong Kong’s own territory. Arguments for non-deference on democratic 
grounds are therefore much stronger in Hong Kong than in the UK. 
Presumptions of Democratic Legitimacy
Even assuming for the sake of argument that democracy was relevant 
solely for assessing institutional capacity in the two cases, the CFI erred 
in making broad presumptions about the primary decision’s democratic 
pedigree. To be fair, the Court in Kong Yun Ming did purport to have 
considered the breadth and quality of public participation in the design 
of the CSSA.69 Yet the Court in Chan Kin Sum suggested conclusive pre-
sumptions of the democratic character of the Legislature’s decisions: 
“One should be very slow . . . to evaluate the quality of the legislative debate, 
particularly with a view to lowering the deference or respect that the courts 
should have, in a given case, for the choice made by the Legislature. Once the 
Legislature has spoken, the courts should generally take it from there”.70 
Courts should be more context-specifi c in evaluating whether the pri-
mary decision is the outcome of a democratic process. The fact that the 
decision is one of the Legislature or came about after public consulta-
tion (eg the ban on prisoner’s right to vote) or public deliberation (eg 
the seven-year residence requirement for CSSA) is no conclusive evi-
dence of a decision’s democratic legitimacy. This is especially true in 
Hong Kong given its democratic defi cit. Courts should be ready to assess 
whether public views have been genuinely accounted for.
It is understandable that courts, as an unelected body, might want 
to use deference to legitimise their decisions, especially those in areas 
that are traditionally considered less or non-justiciable (such as resource 
allocation (eg Kong Yun Ming)). However, popular acceptance must not 
come at the price of constitutional illegitimacy.
Consequences
Did the Court’s erroneous approach to deference lead to wrong deci-
sions in the two cases? Probably not. As explained above, the evidence 
of both cases as revealed seems overwhelmingly imbalanced in favour 
68 See n 65 above.
69 See n 5 above at p 401, para 64.
70 Emphasis in bold added, see n 4 above at p 219, para 154.
14 Cora Chan (2010) HKLJ
of the winning party. The Court seems to have exercised a good sense 
of judgment, hidden under the veneer of deference. Had the suggested 
contextual approach to deference been applied, the outcome of the cases 
would probably have been the same.
However, there are inherent dangers in the Court’s approach to defer-
ence. If it is used by courts that exhibit less common sense and low sensitiv-
ity to rights protection, an over-deferential attitude may result. Deferring 
in a wholesale manner within certain “zones” without specifying the ques-
tion which called for deference, and deferring whenever the government’s 
decision-making process is more democratic, which is nearly always the 
case, as well as deferring with presumptions about the government’s demo-
cratic legitimacy, may lead to an over-deferential attitude that threatens 
the separation of powers as much as over-judicial activism does.71
In addition, the Court’s approach to deference is so indeterminate 
that it may be subject to judges’ manipulation. A case may be classi-
fi ed as one involving policy or right, depending on whether courts are 
willing and brave enough to interfere. Rather than supplementing the 
traditional judicial review framework to delineate the proper boundaries 
of separation of powers, deference may become yet another malleable 
justifi catory device for courts. 
Conclusion
A proper approach to deference is crucial to upholding the separation of 
powers. The Court in Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun Ming has adopted a spa-
tial approach to deference that failed to defi ne specifi cally the contested 
rights issue, inappropriately took into account democratic legitimacy fac-
tors and made broad presumptions about the democratic character of pri-
mary decisions. This approach may lead to an over-deferential attitude that 
threatens the separation of powers, and may be subject to courts’ manipu-
lation. It is hoped that HK courts would in the future adopt a more con-
text-specifi c approach to deference based purely on institutional features. 
Democratic legitimacy should not, on its own strength, call for deference. 
71 Johannes Chan remarked that unchecked deference to the Legislature might lead to a highly 
limited role for courts because “in theory, every piece of legislation must be a result of careful 
thoughts and balance by the Legislature”. Johannes Chan SC, “Basic Law and Constitutional 
Review: The First Decade” 37 HKLJ 407, 425. Brabyn argued that courts should not be “intimidat-
ed by ‘the counter-majoritarian argument’” in protecting fundamental freedoms, and that “a weak 
judiciary is as much a threat to the separation of powers as an overactive one”. Janice Brabyn, “The 
Fundamental Freedom of Assembly and Part III of the Public Order Ordinance” (2002) 32 HKLJ 
271, p 291.
